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rCrim. No. 7436. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1963.) 
THE PEOPLE Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEDRO 
IBARRA, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reserving Questions-Evidence.-
Where there was no objection to the admission of contraband 
at the trial, the trial judge was not called to resolve a conflict 
in the testimony relating to the entry of police officers into 
an apartment in which the contraband was found or to de-
termine whether the police had probable cause to arrest 
defendant, and defendant was precluded from obtaining res-
olution of such issues on appeal. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Defendant in 
a narcotics prosecution who claimed that the narcotic in-
volved was not in his possession was denied his constitutional 
right to the effective aid of counsel in the preparation and 
trial of his case where it appeared that defendant's counsel 
did not know of the rule that a defendant could challenge 
the legality of a search and seizure even though he denied 
that the heroin was taken from him and asserted no propri-
etary interest in the premises that were entered and thus 
failed to object to the introduction into evidence of the 
narcotic alleged to have been possessed by defendant; de-
fense counsel's failure to research the applicable law pre-
cluded the exercise of judglllent on his part and deprived 
defendant of an adjudication of what was the stronger of the 
two defenses available to hi1lJ. 
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-To justify relief 
on the ground that a defendant has been denied his consti-
tutional right to effective aid of counsel in the preparation 
and trial of his ease, an extreme case must be disclosed; it 
must appear that counsel's lack of diligence or competence 
reduced the trial to a farce or sham. 
[4] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-It is counsel's 
duty to investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law 
[2) See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; AmJur., Crim-
inal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, ~ 1080(6); [2-4J 
Criminal Law, § 107; [5, 6] Poisons, § 8.5. 
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that llIay be available to defendant, and if his failure to do 
so results in withdrawing n crucial defense from the case, 
defendant has not had the assistance to which he is entitled. 
[6] Poisons-Commitment for Narcotics Addiction-Discretion of 
Court.-The trial judge failed to exercise the discretion given 
him by Pen. Code, § 6451, to determine whether defendant 
was II. fit subject for commitment as a narcotic addict where, 
on receiving a recommendation from another department of 
the court stating that defendant was rendered ineligible for 
the narcotie treatment center pursuant to Pen. Code, § 6452, 
by reason of two previous convictions of a narcotic felony, 
the trial judge stated that he had no alternative but to im-
pose a prison sentence on defendant, and where § 6452, 
making the statutes relating to commitmcnt as a narcotic 
addict inapplicable to persons convicted, or previously con-
victed of narcotics offenses for which the minimum term pre-
scribed by law is more than five years in prison, did not 
apply to defendant, since he had suffered no previous con-
viction that carried a minimum sentence of more than five 
years, and his present conviction, with only one prior con-
viction charged, carried a minimum sentence of five years. 
[6] Id.-Commitment for Narcotics Addiction-Eligibility.-In 
deciding a defcndant's eligibility for commitment as a nar-
cotics addict uuder Pen. Code, § 6452, making the statutes 
relating to such commitment inapplicable to persons con-
victed, or previously convicted, of narcotics offenses for 
which the minimum term prescribed by law is more than 
five years in prison, a trial judge may not take notice of 
defendant's two prior convictions (which, if alleged, would 
result in a prison term of more than five years in his present 
case) where onl;; one conviction is charged in the information; 
if an allegation of a prior conviction will bar n dcfendant 
from the rehabilitation program, although the trial court 
considers him a fit subject for rehabilitative treatment, that 
allegation should come before the court in a manner affording 
defendaIit adequate opportunity to rebut the allegation. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Irving Hill, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of 
conviction reversed. 
David C. Marcus for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 33. 
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sistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy Attor-
ney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-DE'fendant appeals from a judgment eon-
, vieting him of possession of heroin in violation of Health and 
~ Safety Code section 11500. He contends that the heroin intro-
, duced in evidence was obtained by an unlawful search and 
seizure, that he was denied his right to effective representa-
tion by counsel in that the deputy public defender represent-
ing him failed to object to the admission of tlle lleroin, and 
that the trial court erroneously held him ineligible for com-
mitment to the narcotics rehabilitation center. 
About 12 :25 A.M. on January 19, 1962, three police officers 
without a search or arrest warrant went to the apartment 
of Mrs. Santa Maria. They knocl;:ed on the door and said 
they were police officers. There was no response, and thcy 
knocked again. About two minutes later Mrs. Santa Maria 
opened the door. The officers testified that she motioned with 
her hand and arm for them to enter, and one officer testified 
that she told him to enter so the neighbors would not hear 
them. Mrs. Santa Maria testified that she did not in any 
way consent to the entry. 
On entering the apartment, the officers saw defendant and 
observed on his arm injection marks of a type that suggested 
to them a recent injection of narcotics. Thereupon they 
arrested and searched defendant. The officers testified that 
they removed a tinfoil package of heroin capsules from de- j 
fendant's pocket and that defendant snatched the package, 
obtained aU but one of the capsules, and placed the package 
of capsules in his mouth. They choked defendant to prevent . 
his swallowing the package but were unsuccessful. The one 
capsule retained by the officers, however, proved sufficient to 
show that defendant had been in possession of hcroin. De-
fendant testified that he had possessed narcotics but main-
tained that he had swallowed them shortly before the offkcrs 
arrived. He denied that the capsule of heroin introduced into 
evidence had ever been in his possession. 
Since defense counsel made no objcction to the admission 
of the heroin, the trial judge was not called upon to resolve 
the conflict between the testimony of Mrs. Santa Maria and 
that of the police as to her consent to their entry, nor ,vas he 
called upon to determine whether the police had probable 
cause to arrest defendant. [1] The absence of any objection 
at the trial likewise precludes defendant from obtaining reso-
lution of these issues on appeal. (People v. Rojas, 55 Cal.2d 
Nov. 1963] PEOPLE 'I). IBARRA 463 
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252, 260 [10 Cal.Rptr. 465, 338 P.2d 921, 85 A.L.R.2d 252] ; 
People v. Richardson, 51 Ca1.2d 445, 447 [334 P.2d 573].) 
Defendant contends that even though no objection was raised 
at the trial, this court may reverse a conviction if undispute,l 
evidence shows an infringement of defendant's constitution-
al rights. (See People v. Milllll1l, 42 Ca1.2d 524 [267 P.2d 
1039].) Defendant admits, however, that the lawfulness of 
the officers' entry into the apartment involves a conflict in 
the testimony. Although the undisputed record suggests that 
the officers had no reasonable cause to arrest and search 
defendant,l the prosecution may have had additional evi-
dence on this issue that it did not introduce because of de-
fendant's failure to object. \Ve agree with defendant that 
the officers' own testimony shows that in choking defendant 
they exceeded the limits of permissible police activity. (RoeTz-
in v. State of California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 76 L.E<l. 
183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396].) Defendant's testimony and that of 
the police, how eyer, agree that the choking did not result in 
the production of any eyidellce. We do not accept defend-
ant's contention that the choking so infected the entire trans-
action as to require the exclusion of evidence already in the 
possession of the police before the choking. Accordingly, the 
crucial issue presented by the evidence in the trial court was 
whether the heroin taken from defendant's pocket was legal-
ly obtained. The importance of this issue was not diminished 
by defendant's testimony that he had narcotics when the 
officers knocked but swallowed them before he was searched, 
for that testimony was impeUed by the offer of the heroin 
into evidence and it "cannot be segregated from that evi-
dence to sustain the judgment." (People v. Dixon, 46 Ca1.2d 
456,458 [2% P.2d 557].) 
Following the testimony on the search and seizure, the 
trial court asked defense counsel if he wished to object to the 
admission of the heroin. Defense counsel replied, "\Vell, your 
honor, in view of the testimony from the defendant that the 
lRecent cases indicate that injection marks alone do not give probable 
causc for rarest (P(opic V. F,.,.gllson. ~14 CnL\pp.:!d 7i'2. 7ij·i7ti ['29 
Cal.Rptr. 6!H], but that they do if thcre is additional cvidence suggest· 
ing that defendnnt is a narcotics user People v. Rios, 46 Cal.:!d 297 
[294 r.2d 30]; People v. Elliott, 186 CaI.App.:!d 178, lS:!-183 [8 Cal. 
Rptr. 7:):; 1). In addition to the in.i~ctioll m:lI·k~. the onl~' c\'i,lenec of 
reasonable ('nuse proffered in the prescnt case was the opinion of the 
officers that the marks WNe r,~el'nt. and suggest",} 'In illt":wl'nous injec· 
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object in People's Exhibit W 1\.·1 [the heroin] was not in his 
possession and was not taken from him, under such circum· 
stances I could not makl' II lIIotion to object to its introduc. 
tion. So far as I know I would have no grounds since defend· 
ant has denied this was in his possession or taken from 
him.'t The court again inquired, "I take it therefore that 
there is no objection offered T" Counsel replied, "No, your 
honor"; whereupon the court admitted the heroin into evi. 
dence. 
[2a] Defendant contends that the failure of his counsel 
to object demonstrates a lack of knowledge of the law that 
establishes a denial of his constitutional right to "effective 
aid in the preparation and trial of the case." (Powell v. 
State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55,77 L.Ed. 157, 
171.172, 84 A.L.R. 527, 541].) [3] To justify relief on this 
ground, "an extreme case must be disclosed." (Maye v. 
Pcscor, 162 F.2d 641, 643 j see Fellman, The Defendant's 
Rights (1958) p. 124; Fellman, The Right to C01tnsel Under 
State Law (1955) Wisc.L.Rev. 281, 314; 4 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 
400.403; Statc v. Benge, 61 Iowa 658, 662 [17 N.W. 100].) It 
must appear that counsel's lack of diligence or competpnee 
reduced the trial to a "farce or a sham." (People v. lVein, 
50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [326 P.2d 457] ; Pcople v. Robillard, 55 
Ca1.2d 88, 96·98 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295] ; People v. 
Hughes, 57 Ca1.2d 89, 99 [17 Cal.Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33].) • 
[4] It is counsel's duty to investigate carefully all defenses' 
of fact and of law that may be available to the defendant, 
and if his failure to do so results in withdrawing a crucial 
defense from the case, the defendant has not had the assist- . 
ance to which he is entitled. (PeopLc v. lIIattson, 51 Cal.2fl 
777, 790-791 [336 P.2d 937] j People v. Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d 
289, 296 [194 P.2d 829]; see also Mitchell v. United State s, 
259 F.2d 787, 793.) Thus, in Brubaker v. Dixon, 310 F.2d 30, 
the defendant sought habeas corpus on the ground that his 
counsel had failed to present the defense of diminished rc· 
sponsibility (see PeopLc v. Gorshe"" 51 Ca1.2d 716, 733 [336 
P.2d 492] j Pcople v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330, 343·357 [202 P.2d 
53]) and to object to the admission of his confessions into 
evidence. In ordering a hearing on the allegations of the 
petition, the Court of Appeals stated: "Upon an examination 
of the whole record, we conclude that appellant alleged a 
combination of circumstances, not refuted by the record, 
which, if trne, precluded the presentation of his availablt, 
defenses to the court and the jury through no fault of his 
) 
) 
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own, and thus rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Ap-
pellant does not complain that after investigation and re-
search trial counsel made decisions of tactics and strategy 
injurious to appellant's cause; the allegation is rather that 
trial counsel failed to prepare, and that appellant's defense 
was withheld not through deliberate though faulty judgment, 
but in default of knowledge that reasonable inquiry would 
havc produced, and hence in default of any judgment at all. 
The omissions alleged by appellant 'were not mere mistakes 
of counselor errors in the course of the trial. If true, they 
constituted a total failure to present the cause of the accused 
in any fundamental respect. Such a proceeding would not 
constitute for the accused the fair trial contemplated by the 
due process clause ... .' [Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (80 
App.D.C. 254).)" (310 F.2d at pp. 38.39; fns. omitted.) 
[2b] In the present case the record demonstrates that de-
fendant's counsel did not know of the rule that defendant 
could challenge the legality of the search and seizure even 
though he denied that the heroin was taken from him and 
asserted no proprietary interest in the premises that were 
entered. (People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 759·761 [290 P.2d 
855] ; People v. Gale, 46 Ca1.2d 253, 257 [294 P.2d 13] ; Peo· 
ple v. Colonna, 140 Cal.App.2d 705, 707-709 [295 P.2d 490] ; 
People v. Silva, 140 Cal.App.2d 791, 794 [295 P.2d 942);. 
People v. Jager, 145 Cal.App.2d 792, 799 [303 P.2d 115] ; see. 
also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-267 [80 S.Ct. 
725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 702-706, 78 A.L.R.2d 233, 239-243].) This 
rule should be a commonplace to any attorney engaged in 
criminal trials. It was established in People v. Martin, supra, 
within a year of this court's adoption of the exclusionary 
rule (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 
A.L.R.2d 513]) in one of the group of cases decided shortly 
after the Cahan case to articulate the rules governing the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. It may be readily 
found in standard reference works. (\Vitkin, Cal. Evidence, 
§ 24, pp .. 34-36; 44 Cal.J ur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 9, pp. 
280-281; Martin, Probable Cause to Arrest and Admissibility 
of Evidence, Authorized by Attorney General Mosk (1960 
rev. ed.) Printing Div., Documents Section, Sacramento, 
Defendant May Rely on Rights of Others, p. 219; MeKinney, 
New Cal. Dig., Criminal Law, § 413.5 (4); West's Cal. Dig., 
Criminal Law, § 394.5 (2).) 
Counsel's failure to rl's('arch thl' applieable law precluded 
the exercise of judgment on his part and df'priYed defenclant 
) 
) 
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of an adjudication of what was clearly the stronger of the 
two defenses available to him. There is no merit in the con-
tention that counsel's failure to object to the introduction of 
the heroin into evidence may have reflected a considered 
judgment that by objecting he would weaken defendant's 
denial that the lleroin was taken from him. Tht're would have 
been no inconsistency in asserting that there was no consent 
to the entry and no probable eause to arrest and search and 
also that no heroin was found in defendant's possC'ssion. In 
any eYent, the record leaves no room for speculation. Coun-
sel's statement to the court makes perfectly clear that his 
decision reflected, not judgment, but unawareness of a rule of 
law basic to the casc; a rule that reasonable preparation 
would have revealed. Counsel's failure to object precluded 
resolution of the crucial factual issues supporting defend-
ant's primary defense. It thereby reduced llis trial to a farcc 
and a sham. 
[5] Since the judgment must be reversed, we shall con-
sider defendant's tinal contention, which may arise on re-
trial. He contends that the trial judge failed to exC'rcise thc 
discretion given him by Penal Code, section 6451. That sec-
tion provides: "Upon conviction of a defendant for any 
crime in any superior court, if the judge ascertains that the 
defendant is addicted or by reason of repeated use of nar-
cotics is in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcot-
ics he shall adjourn the proceedings or suspend the imposi-
tion of the sentence and direct the sheriff to file a petition to 
ascertain if such person is addicted to narcotics or in immi-
nent danger thereof unless in the opinion of the judge the 
defendant's record and probation report indicate such a pat-
tern of criminality that he does not constitute a tit subject 
for commitment under this section .... " 
The trial judge determined that defendant was addicted or 
in imminent danger of addiction, and referred the case to 
another department of the superior court for a recommenda-
tion on defendant's eligibility for the narcotics rellabilitation 
program. That department replied that "this case is being 
rejected as the defendant, according to the arrest record and 
probation report, has been twice convicted of a narcotic fel-
ony and on each occasion sentenced to federal prison. These 
priors coupled with the present offellse would r('nder him 
ineligible for the narcotic treatment center, pursuanf fo 
§ 6152 P.C." (Italics added.) The trial jullge there upon 
told defendant: "I had hoped that Department 95 would 
) 
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find you eligible for the treatment program so that you 
could be returned to ordinary life and have the oppor-
tunity to support your family as soon as they would pro-
nounce you cured. Unfortunately they have not found you 
eligible because of the two prior convictions of violation of 
narcotics laws .... So, Mr. Ibarra, I have no alternative, 
under the law as it is written, but to impose a state prison 
sentence. " ." 
It is clear from this language that the judge did not exer-
cise his discretion to determine whether defendant was a fit 
subject for the program, but instead decided that section 
6452 barred defendant from the program. That decision was 
erroneous. Section 6452 reads in part: "Sections 6450 and 
6451 shall not apply to persons convicted of, or who have 
previously been convicted of ... any offense set forth in arti-
cle 1 (commencing with section 11500) or 2 (commencing I 
with section 11530) of chapter 5 of division 10 of the Healthi 
and Safety Code ... for which the minimum term prescribed I 
by law is more than five years in state prison." Defendant. 
has suffered no previous conviction that carried a minimum I 
sentence of more than five years, and his present conviction, I 
with only one prior conviction charged, carries a minimum I 
sentence of five years. "Five years" is less than "more than 
five years." (See People v. Wallace, 59 Ca1.2d 548, 553 [30 
Cal.Rptr. 449, 381 P.2d 185].) 
[6] The Attorney General maintains, however, that in 
deciding defendant's eligibility under section 6452, the trial 
judge could take notice of defendant's two prior convictions 
even though only one conviction was charged in the informa-
tion.2 A contrary interpretation, he contends, would operate 
to the disadvantage of persons in defendant '8 position in 
that district attorneys would henceforth charge all prior con-
victions in the information, thus compelling defendants to 
serve longer sentences. We are not persuaded that district 
attorneys otherwise inclined to dismiss prior convictions will 
refrain from so doing to render defendants ineligible for the 
rehabilitation program. If an allegation of a prior conviction 
will bar a defendant from the program, although the trial 
judge con::;iders him a fit subject for rehabilitative treatment, 
2In deciding whether defendant is a fit suhject for the rehahilitation 
program (Pen. Code, ~ (451), the trial judge may properly consider the 
defendant's probation report, including facts therein relating to prior 
convictions of the defendant not charged. in the information. 
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that allegation should come before the court in a manner 
affording the defendant adequate opportunity to rebut the 
allegation. Charging tIle prior cOllYiction in the information 
fulfills this requirement, but merely presenting the conviction 
in a probation report does not.· 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., con-
curred. 
McComb, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the jUdgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Wood in the 
opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in 
People v. Ibarra (Cal.App.) 30 Cal.Rptr. 223. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1963. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
aPeople v. Tell, 126 Cal.App.2d 208 [271 P.2d 568], and People v. 
I,cach, 22 Cal.App.2d 525, 527 [71 P.2d 594J, holding that a trial judge 
may consider cODvictions not charged in the information in deciding a 
dcf!'n<1:mt's eligibility for probntion under Penal Code section 1203, are 
distinguishable. Those cases rest on the language of section 1203, and in 
particular upon the requirement in thnt section that prolJation be denied 
"unless the court 8hall be satisfied that he had never been previousl,. 
convirted of a felony." (Italics by the court in People v. Tell, supra.) 
